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Investors reveal a tendency to prefer domestic over foreign equities despite the 
financial losses. From institutional perspective the factors that cause home biasness 
are the barriers to entry the foreign markets, transaction costs, illiquidity, 
asymmetric information and information costs, corporate governance and inflation 
and exchange rate risks. Behavioral finance argues that irrationality of investors 
cause the home biasness. Investors tend to be under the influence of psychological 
biases: optimism, overconfidence, social identity, narrow framing and loss aversion. 
In this paper we introduce a model of optimal portfolio of Czech investors with 
three utility functions: Markowitz, exponential and CRRA. The prediction of the 
model without short selling suggests that Czech investors should have more than 60 
% (between 72 - 83 % for feasible levels of risk aversion) in domestic equities. The 
OECD data claims that they hold around 87 % in domestic equities. 
 





I.  Introduction 
 
Equity home bias is a situation on a market when investors hold an unreasonably high share 
of their portfolios in domestic equities. This is in a sharp contrast with the traditional finance 
theory which suggests that the investors should fully exploit the opportunities that arise from 
the potential diversification. The international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) based on 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) predicts that an investor should hold equities from a 
country as per that country’s share of world market capitalisation (Mishra, 2008). The less the 
integrated international markets are the higher the benefits from international diversification 
could be. The studies by Harvey (1991) and Chan et al. (1992) indicate a lack of integration 
between the US and major Asian markets. The US and European equity markets seem to be 
better integrated as shows the evidence of  Kasa (1992) and Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993). 
The findings of De Fusco et al. (1996) and Gilmore and McManus (2001) indicate that the 
equity market in the US is not integrated with the emerging markets in the geographical 
regions of the Pacific basin, Latin America, the Mediterranean and the Central Europe. These 
studies provide evidence that the correlation coefficients between the indices in different 
countries in the world are still quite low. In Section 5 we will show the recent correlation 
coefficients between the 10 national stock indices. The message from the low international 
integration is that the investors should diversify their portfolios into equities in different 
countries to earn benefits from risk reduction.  
 
The question of high domestic equities concentration bothered the economist at least since 
Levy and Sarnat (1970) were one of the first to discover the equity home bias phenomenon on 
US equities. Since 1970 there has been vast number of studies that confirmed the existence 
home bias not only in US, but also many other countries in the world. Tesar and Werner 
(1995) presented international investment positions of USA and Canada in the period 1975-
1990, pointing out the home biasness of investors in these two countries. Cooper and Kaplanis 
(1994) showed the extent of equity portfolios concentration with domestic equities among 8 
world major economies. According to this study, in 1987 the most home biased investors 
were in Sweden (100 % share of domestic equities), the best situation was in France (“only” 
64,4 % share of domestic equities). Further evidence of home bias was provided by Adler and 
Dumas (1983), Lewis (1994), Lewis (1999) and Zalewska (2005), for example. The 
interesting contributions are the papers by Oehler et al. (2008) and Barker D.  and T. 2 
 
Loughran (2007). The first paper recognizes an strong “Europe bias” among German mutual 
funds. The second paper introduces the “geographical bias”. The study provides evidence that 
the closer the companies are to each other the more are their stock returns correlated. 
 
The recent papers do not focus mainly on providing only other proofs of the phenomenon, but 
they try to view the puzzle from different perspectives and value the possible impacts of 
different factors. From the simplest perspective we can divide these factors into two groups: 
institutional and behavioral, that will be discussed in more details in the following sections. 
Institutional reasons of the existence of home bias are stemming from the violation of the 
main assumption of traditional finance: the ”perfect” markets. There should be no barriers to 
entry, no transaction or information costs and markets should react in almost no time. On the 
other hand, the behavioral factors view the puzzle from the perspective of violation of the 
second key assumption: rational investors. Investors should evaluate all possible investment 
opportunities and react upon their best judgment.  
 
In the paper we will examine whether there is equity home bias in the Czech Republic. We 
will compare the actual evidence with the theoretical composition of a investment portfolio 
model. Before we introduce the model of optimal portfolio allocation, we will provide the 
reader with a short summary of the methodological issues connected with measurements of 
home bias. Then, we will follow with the description of the model: assumptions, data and 
results. And finally, we will compare the theoretical portfolio compositions with the reality 
based on the OECD (2006) evidence.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sections II. and III., we review the institutional and 
behavioral factors that should explain the existence of the equity home bias. Section IV. 
investigates the methodology of the home bias studies and we describe the model of optimal 
portfolio with Markowitz utility function. In Section V we evaluate the home biasness of 
Czech investors based on our results. We also provide with a sensitivity analysis with 
different utility functions. In Section VI. we reach some conclusions. 
 
II.  Institutional explanations  
 
The home bias can be explained by violations of the main assumption of international 
financial: high liquid markets without barriers to entry, high transaction or information costs, 3 
 
asymmetric information problems and the possibilities of moral hazard connected to the 
corporate governance of the firms. The arguments against these assumptions may help us 
understand the reasons of the equity home bias. 
 
Firstly, there still exist some barriers to enter the foreign financial markets. One of the barriers 
are the restriction on foreign exchange transaction. There is a sufficient amount of evidence 
that proves that this type of barrier has fallen over time. French and Poterba (1991) and 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) argue that the explicit barriers are no longer large enough to 
explain the observed portfolio allocations of investors. However, there is a paper by Zalewska 
(2005) that explains the existence of home bias by the existence of restrictions in the 
investment policies of pension funds. According to her study,  German, Italian and Canadian 
funds can not invest more than 20 % of their assets abroad. In the Netherlands foreign assets 
can be up to 70 % of their portfolios. The UK and US regulators are more liberal and do not 
set a rule to the size of international investments. Emerging markets restrictions are generally 
stronger; the Polish pension fund can have only up to 5 % foreign assets, Peru 8 % and 
Argentina 10 %. Brazil and Chile are standing on opposite sides, Brazilian pension funds have 
to lock all their assets at home, while the Chilean allow up to 30 % of the money to allocate in 
foreign securities. Despite the existence of the restrictions of pension funds, home bias cannot 
be explained only by those, because also other investors reveal the preference for domestic 
stocks. 
 
Secondly, researchers have tried to explain the home bias by the transaction costs:  high direct 
trading costs, as fees and commissions to the brokers and low liquidity. Tesar and Werner 
(1995) and Kang and Stulz (1997) that the stocks that are traded by foreign investors are 
traded frequently, implying that the variable costs should not be prohibitively high. The 
frequency of trading is connected closely to liquidity issue that is discussed in next section. 
There is however a different study that criticized the conclusions of the Tesar and Werner´s 
(1995) evidence of very high turnover rates on foreign equity portfolios. Warnock (2002) 
claimed that this study had underestimated the cross-border equity positions. The new study’s 
findings are that the foreign turnover rates calculated using information from comprehensive 
benchmark surveys on cross-border holdings are much lower than previously reported and 
comparable to domestic turnover rates. However, this study concludes that the basic intuition 
from the Tesar–Werner study, that transaction costs do not help explain the observed home 
bias, was confirmed using data on transaction costs in 41 markets (Warnock 2002). 4 
 
 
Thirdly, to learn and evaluate information is not free. On the contrary, information processing 
is highly priced in the financial world. Foreign investors generally lack the common local 
knowledge, have less information about the functioning of the financial market and the future 
perspectives of the firms listed on the equity market. They are therefore in a less feasible 
position than domestic investors.  They can learn about the companies, but they have to pay 
additional “learning” costs. The indirect proof of the information problems are the existence 
of information providing and credit rating companies. If all investors were able to learn about 
all information without any costs there would be such companies as Bloomberg, Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s. The impact of the information costs may be severe, but we did not find 
any study that would explain home bias only by the existence of information costs.  
 
Fourthly, the home bias studies explain that the asymmetric information problems are higher 
for investors across borders. Foreign investors are generally in higher risk of not knowing the 
correct situation of the firms. Coval and Moskowitz (2002) show that US investment 
managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, particularly small, 
highly levered firms that produce non-traded goods. These results suggest that asymmetric 
information between local and non-local investors may drive the preference for 
geographically proximate investments. The relation between the investment proximity, firm 
size and leverage may shed light on several well-documented asset pricing anomalies. 
Investors seem to value local firms differently from the further firms, because they are 
including the asymmetric information risks into their price evaluation. Foreign firms are 
therefore riskier. Asymmetric information has been provided as an explanation of home 
biasness also in the paper of Matsen (2002). He examined the allocation decision of an 
investor who owns two projects, a domestic and a foreign one. In his model, a manager 
governs the expected return from each project, and the investor has less information on the 
actions of the foreign manager. His profits would be different if he received full information. 
With asymmetric information, he generally achieved a better risk-return characteristic of his 
net terminal wealth with an allocation different from full diversification, because a “biased” 
allocation can be beneficial to the managers’ efforts and risk properties of the optimal 
contracts (Matsen 2002). The paper however concludes that numerical simulations illustrate 
that, in general, the portfolio bias is small. According to the study, the asymmetric 5 
 
information does not look like as a prime reason for the observed home-bias in portfolio 
allocation. 
Finally, there is evidence on how the corporate governance and internal regulation of 
investment managers can creates compulsory home biased preference. If the rights of 
investors are poorly protected then those who are in control of firms have the ability to 
expropriate assets, firms may find it too expensive to raise funds unless those in control can 
commit to limit the expropriation. When those in control of a firm have a large stake in the 
firm’s cash flows, expropriation is expensive for them as it involves them paying a large 
fraction of these deadweight costs. Consequently, having a controlling shareholder with a 
large cash flow stake is one solution whereby firms can become public and raise public equity 
(Dahlquist et al., 2002). There is evidence that the investor protection is vital for sound equity 
investment environment. According to an entrepreneurship model of Shleifer and Wolfenson 
(2002) the probability of getting caught is higher in countries with better shareholder 
protection. In their model, better investor protection leads to greater recourse of external 
financing by firms. Furthermore, the largest companies are controlled by the large 
shareholders and foreign investors are therefore unable to gain a controlling amount of 
equities. Pinkowitz et al. (2001) constructed an estimate of the world portfolio of shares 
available to investors who are not controlling shareholders. According to their study, the 
available world portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. The foreign 
investors are in a disadvantage, because they can hold only a small fraction of a company, 
while the major part remains in the hands of majority investors. Foreign investors can gain 
almost no control power of the firm and their valuation of the investment decreases, which 
can distract them from the investment. The corporate governance studies provide us with a 
possible solution how to eliminate the home bias. To decrease the home biasness of the 
investors it is important to improve the investors’ rights across countries, where the firms are 
mostly controlled by large shareholders. 
Barriers to entry, transaction and information costs, asymmetric information and corporate 
governance can help to understand the source of investment home biasness from the 
institutional perspective. However, the evidence shows that none of these factors can fully 
explain the extent of home biasness alone. We have already mentioned that the barriers to 
entry and transaction costs improved significantly in last decades. The reduction of 
institutional problems should correspond to decrease in home bias tendencies, which has been 6 
 
confirmed by the study of Amadi (2004). He demonstrates that there has been a distinct 
reduction in equity home bias in recent years. In his paper he examines if any of the 
theoretical explanations or recent developments such as free trade and globalization, the 
advent the internet, and the rise of emerging markets and mutual fund investment have 
affected the increase in the international diversification. The empirical analysis demonstrates 
that the rise of the internet and mutual fund investments have indeed affected the changes in 
foreign diversification (Amadi, 2004). The reason for the increase in diversification is the 
decrease in the asymmetric information and increase in the transparency.  
III.  Behavioral explanations 
 
In the recent years the behavioral finance has been evolving rapidly and it can help us to 
understand the sources of home biasness from a different perspective. The traditional 
assumption of rational investors seems to be too strong. Shleifer (2000) argues that not only 
the investors are behaving irrationally, but there is also herd irrationality. Groups of investors 
do not evaluate their investments properly and even if they do, they do not act upon their 
evaluations. He argues that the herd irrationality cannot be offset by rational investors if there 
are no truly rational investors on the market. Behavioral finance tries to explain the actual 
behavior of investors with the advice of experimental psychology. Barberis and Thaler (2002) 
have taken into account the psychological biases to explain the biases on the markets. Some 
of these psychological biases can be reasons for the home biasness of the investors. 
 
Firstly, we will discuss the psychological bias of optimism. People tend to display 
unrealistically optimist views of their abilities and prospects and they tend to be too 
overconfident in their own judgments. The psychologist surveys show that over 90 % of 
people think that they are above average in some ability (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). The 
optimist domestic investor would buy much more domestic equities than it should be rational.  
The results of optimism towards the performance of domestic firms were documented by 
Fellner and Maciejovski (2003). Their results show that there is a general optimistic 
perception of the domestic industry. Companies at home are expected to be performing much 
better by domestic than by foreign investors. The other study looks at the role of optimism 
from a different perspective. Graham et al. (2006) investigate the optimism and its effect on 
the trading frequencies. They provide theoretical link between the optimistic feelings of 
investors and the trading strategies. Optimistic investors believe that they have about average 7 
 
skills and knowledge about the stock market. This belief makes them feel more competent to 
trade in stocks. In the paper they found evidence that investors who feel to be more competent 
trade more often and have more internationally diversified portfolios. 
 
Secondly, the source of home biasness can be found in the psychological biases of narrow 
framing and loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) demonstrated that people do not 
evaluate their utility from the total outcome, but instead they are usually evaluating different 
risk separately. Narrow framing means that the investor would derive the utility of the specific 
investment separately. The possible losses and gains of the investment are evaluated 
independently to the impact on total wealth of the investor. The prospect theory claims that 
people define their utilities separately over their gains and losses rather than over their final 
wealth. It means that the total utility of 100 CZK loss followed by the 100 CZK gain is no 
longer zero. People tend to be more risk averse over their losses, therefore their utility would 
be below zero. In standard prospect theory the people preferences exhibit the risk aversion for 
gains, risk loving for losses and loss aversion
1. The loss aversion can distract investments into 
risky assets with higher volatility. Volatile stocks can bring higher losses, which are more 
painful than the possible gains. Magi (2007) provided an explanation of aggregate portfolio 
behavior in the framework that took into account the narrow framing bias described in the 
previous section. In the paper, the utility of wealth of the representative investors was not 
derived only from the total consumption level, but also from the wealth fluctuations caused by 
the financial assets. In his paper he made an assumption that the investor behaved loss 
aversely and framed the investments into foreign stocks separately. This study concludes that 
if we take into account the loss aversion and narrow framing than the model of international 
portfolio choice provide a plausible explanation of the equity home bias puzzle.  
 
Thirdly, the other behavioral explanation was provided by Fellner and Maciejovski (2003). In 
their paper they further investigated home biasness from the perspective of the social identity 
of investors. They conducted an experiment in which they contrasted institutional with 
behavioral explanations of the home bias. They compared the asymmetric information with 
the social identity. The results of the experiment show that social forces lead to a domestically 
biased portfolio. Social identity of being a citizen of a country drives investors to invest into 
                                                 
1   These preferences create a special convex-concave (convex for losses, concave for gains) shape of 
utility fiction that can be found in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 8 
 
the domestic equities. They argue that social identity explains the observed home bias equally 
well as the asymmetric information. 
The irrationality of investors is a plausible explanation of the equity home bias. Behavioral 
finance with the help of cognitive psychology provides a theoretical framework, as well as 
substantial evidence, that explain the home biasness of investors. Optimism, loss aversion, 
narrow framing and social identity are the potential behavioral features that can explain the 
home bias puzzle. There is however a vast space for further research in this area. The studies 
that try to explain the home biasness can answer more questions about the actual belief 
formation and preferences of the real world investors.  
IV.  Methodology  
 
IV.1. Model selection 
 
In the literature the recognition of equity home bias has been generally taken as a task to 
evaluate the optimal investment portfolio and compare it with the actual evidence. The early 
models were applied from portfolio selection framework of Markowitz (1952). The IAPM 
based on Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) makes a very strong conclusion that all investors 
should in equilibrium hold equities in same proportions: weighted by the market 
capitalizations. The home bias puzzle was discovered in the papers of international 
diversification of investment portfolios (Levy and Sarnat, 1970). Adler and Dumas (1983) 
proposed an international asset pricing model (CAPM), which resulted in a vector of optimal 
weights of an investor with a given utility function. This asset pricing approach is based on a 
mean-variance optimalization. The researchers that try to prove the existence of home bias 
use concave utility functions and search for their maximum.  The development in this 
approach introduced Magi (2007) who extends this model with a special utility function over 
the gains/losses from foreign investments. This utility is in accordance with the Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) convex-concave utility function which is steeper for losses. The 
alternative is to take the optimal weights given as a proportion of individual equity market 
capitalization from total world equity market capitalization as was proposed in IAPM by 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). It is clear that based on their model we would conclude 
that the Czech equity market is strongly home biased because the optimal weights of domestic 
equity holdings for Czech investors should be far below 1 percentage. Therefore, we prefer 
the mean-variance optimization framework. 9 
 
 
In our optimal portfolio model we use different utility functions to answer the question 
whether the Czech investors are biased towards the domestic equities. We will develop a 
model of investment portfolio which is very similar to the model used in Lewis (1999). She 
tested a bias implied by a standard CAPM model for two assets, domestic and foreign 
equities. She derived a model from the basic mean-variance approach modified for inclusion 
of foreign securities. In our model we will use a more general version of the model for N 
indices and Markowitz utility function. This is a concave utility function which approximates 
the preferences of the investors who are risk averse. He higher the curvature of the utility 
function, the higher the risk averseness. In the case of Markowitz utility function, the level of 
risk averseness is described by the coefficient lambda. The utility function will be described 
in the following section. The alternatives to this utility functions are the exponential utility 
functions that exhibit the constant absolute risk aversion or the logarithmic utility function 
that exhibit the constant relative risk aversion. In modern portfolio theory the risk aversion is 
measured as a reward (expected returns) for the risk (standard deviation) which is in 
correspondence with our utility function. In following sections we will also introduce models 
with different utility functions. 
 
IV. 2. Assumptions of the model 
 
The main assumptions of the model are that there are no transaction costs and no barriers to 
enter on a market. We assume the weak form market efficiency. Furthermore, we assume that 
the returns are normally distributed with the mean and variance which are constant in time, 
i.e. same as historical mean and variance during 1998-2008. Therefore, in the model we get 
N=10 weak form efficient markets with country specific drifts. Investors are assumed to be 
rational and cannot influence the price. They have free access to all relevant information and 
evaluate only the relevant information. New events are expected to be random with a zero 
mean on price change, therefore they form their expectation only based on historical prices 
and historical variances. Finally, we also assume that all investors are maximizing their 
utilities. All investors have the same utility function. In the model we assume a risk averse 
investor with a concave utility function that is increasing in expected profits and decreasing in 
expected risk. For the sake of simplicity we assume that there is not a risk free investment 
opportunity other than no investment. This assumption implies that investors will invest into 10 
 
stock all their wealth unless they get less money than their initial wealth at the end of the 
investment period. We also assume that the investors do not take into account the inflation.  
 
IV. 3. Model of optimal equity portfolio with Markowitz utility function 
 
In this section we will introduce a model derived from CAPM model (Lewis, 1999) to 
determine how much foreign equities should have an average Czech investor in his equity 
portfolio. We will evaluate the more realistic case of risk averse investor who tries to 
maximize his risk adjusted wealth. He is trading off between risk and returns. In our model 
are his preferences described by a Markowitz utility function:  
        ) var( 1 1      t t t W W E U                      (1) 






 t tW E
U
and decreasing in variance of his future wealth:    


 ) var( 1 t W
U
. 
The higher is his risk aversion measured by , the lower will be his utility from a given level 
of variance.  
 
How big should the coefficient of risk aversion be? Suppose that investor invested all of his 
funds to one single stock index. The following table shows us his utility if the stock prices 
followed the expected growth patterns for different levels of   for monthly data. 
 
Table 2: 100% investment into single stock index (monthly horizon)   
               
  
R 
CR  R US  R EU  R JA 
R 




SA R  NZ 
AVERAGE  0,0109 -0,0039 -0,0022 -0,0046 0,0153 0,0012 0,0008 0,0077 0,0029 -0,0021 
VAR  0,0048 0,0030 0,0034 0,0043 0,0223 0,0352 0,0928 0,0158 0,0069 0,0035 
                  
Wealth (t=0)  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Wealth (t=1)  1,0109 0,9961 0,9978 0,9954 1,0153 1,0012 1,0008 1,0077 1,0029 0,9979 
                  
Utility (1/3)  1,0093 0,9950 0,9966 0,9940 1,0078 0,9895 0,9699 1,0024 1,0006  0,9968 
Utility (1/2)  1,0086 0,9945 0,9961 0,9933 1,0041 0,9836 0,9544 0,9998 0,9995 0,9962 
Utility (1)  1,0062 0,9930 0,9943 0,9911 0,9930 0,9660 0,9080 0,9919 0,9961 0,9944 
Utility (2)  1,0014 0,9900 0,9909 0,9868 0,9707 0,9308 0,8152 0,9762 0,9892 0,9909 
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Table 2 shows us a case of investments in completely isolated markets, where the investors 
can invest only into their domestic stock index. We can see that for a single 100 % investment 
into one stock index even the risk aversion  1   is quite high. For  1    the only profitable 
investment opportunity would be the Czech stock index. In this case the only investment that 
would make sense (on the assumption of non-negative risk-free rate) would be the investment 
to Czech stock index. All other possibilities mean the decrease of utility at the end of next 
period. It is interesting to realize that investment which was the most beneficial for risk-
neutral investor (100% into Russian index) would mean decrease of utility of risk averse 
investor with Markowitz utility function with 1   . The limiting risk aversion for which 
would an investor invest into any (in this case Czech) stock index (on the assumption of only 
100% investments) is  7 , 2   . Investors who are more risk averse would not invest at all.  
 
We will proceed with the description of the model. In our case, the investor can choose from n 
stock indices. We assume that investor invests all his wealth into stocks so he gets the 
maximum utility of the expected wealth at the end of the next period. Let us denote the vector 
of expected returns as a (n x 1) vector r , the transposed vector of returns looks like: 
 n r r r r ,..., , 2 1   2. Our investor can sell stock indices even without owning them and buy them 
with profit at the end of next period. Therefore he can gain even from the downfall of the 
stock prices.  
 
Let us denote for the (n x n) variance-covariance matrix,   for a (n x 1) vector of desirable 
weights of the stock indices in portfolio:  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n        and I  for a (n x 1) 
vector: ) 1 ,..., 1 , 1 (   I . Investor is constrained with an equation: 1 ... 2 1     n    . If we 
rewrite this condition in matrix algebra we get an optimalization constraint: 1    I  . In this 
model we will allow for costless short selling so the weights can be also negative. 
In this notation the investor utility function of the portfolio at the end of next period: 
              
2 ) 1 ( t t W r W U                           (2) 
                                                 
2  In a model I assume only 1 period investment, therefore I  will use henceforth the notation of r instead 
of  1  t tr E . In our case:  CR r r  1 ,  US r r  2 ,  EU r r  3 ,  JA r r  4 ,  RS r r  5 ,  CH r r  6 ,  IN r r  7 ,  BZ r r  8 , 
SA r r  9 ,  NZ r r  10 . 
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we can simplify the equation by the assumption:  1  t W . To solve the maximization problem 
we need a Lagrangean function: 
) 1 ( ) 1 (                I r L                                                 (3) 
where  R    is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order condition with respect to   is
3: 






                                                          (4) 
solving for ,  0    : 











                                                                    (5) 
where 
1   is inverse to . We can rewrite the equation (5): 
I r   
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   

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which transposed gives: 
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and multiplied by I: 
1
2 2
1 1 1  
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                                          (8) 
which is the investor’s constraint condition. Realizing that I I 

  
1  is only a number and 
therefore  0 ) (
1 1 1        

    

  
   I I I I I I . Also we should note that the variance-
covariance matrix and therefore also 
1   is symmetric which means the transposed matrix 
is identical to original matrix:     and 1 1    

 . We can now rewrite for  : 
I I
I r
   
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                                          (10) 
This is our final equation. We will solve the optimal portfolio weights for the monthly and 
quarterly for 5 levels of risk aversion: 3 / 1 2 / 1 , 1 , 2 , 3 and   . The results of the tested model 
are presented in the following section.  
                                                 
3   This statement is expressed in matrix form, there are in fact n F. O. C.´s. 13 
 
IV. 3. Model of optimal equity portfolio with exponential utility function 
 
We will introduce an alternative utility function to show if the results of the previous 
optimization problem are robust. This model have similar assumptions including the 
assumption of normally distributed returns which is vital for the numerical method of solving 
this model. We are again maximizing utility given the optimization constraint that the sum of 
the weight should be 1.. In this case we use the CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion 
Function). We will focus only on the case of not allowed short selling. Therefore we have to 
solve the model numerically with a restriction that the individual portfolio  weights of a single 
stock can not be negative. Our model can be rewritten as follows: 
: , max that so U  1    I                                                                (11) 
The CARA utility function:  
 
)) 1 ( exp( r W E U t                                                                      (12) 
where   is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. For simplicity, we again assume that 
1  t W . The assumption of the normally distributed returns leads to a log normal distribution 
and we search for the expected value:  





, exp( )) , ( ( r r r r LN E                                      (13) 
Finally, we can rewrite our utility maximizing problem as : 
)
2
) ( exp( max
2   
  
 
     r E U                                               (14) 
 
IV.4. Model of optimal equity portfolio with CRRA utility function 
 
To improve our sensitivity analysis we add the Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility 
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t t  so that:  1    I                       (15) 
where    is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We assume non-negative portfolio 
weights because the short sell is not allowed.  To calculate the portfolio weights we use a 
numerical approximation of  the integral of expected value of the utility function: 14 
 
dr r x f
r W





















                                (16) 
where ) , ; (   x f is density of normal distribution with parameters a  . This utility 
maximization problem with the CRRA utility is irrelevant on absolute wealth. Portfolio 
weights will be same with investments 1 CZK or 1 mil CZK. 
 
 V.      Optimal portfolio in the Czech Republic 
 
V. 1. Data description  
 
To test the home bias puzzle in Czech Republic we need to simulate a world equity portfolio. 
In the model we use 10 years of monthly data starting in May 1998 and finishing in May 
2008
4. For Czech investors the world equity market comprises of 9 foreign and one domestic 
stock index
5. Foreign equity indices were converted into CZK and the monthly continuous 







r  6.  
 
V. 2.  International portfolio diversification in the Czech Republic 
 
Based on our data we will try to examine the degree of the integration of Czech equity 
market. As discussed above the degree of integration has been judged by the correlations 
between financial markets. The higher is the correlation, the higher is the integration. We use 
the monthly data of N=10 stock indices described above and calculate the historical 
correlation coefficients between the indices. Correlation coefficients between Czech and 
                                                 
4   The monthly data were taken as the closing prices at the end of month, starting at the end of May 1998 
and finishing at the end of May 2008. For the indices of New Zealand and South Africa the monthly data were 
taken as the opening prices at the beginnings of following months. I assume that the one day difference should 
have only a neglectable impact on the investment decision. 
5   Domestic index: PX. Foreign equities: United States: SP 500 (US), European Union: Dow Jones 
EUROSTOX 50 (EU) – consists of 12 EU countries excluding Czech Republic , Japan: Nikkei (JA), Russia: 
RTS $ (RS), China: Schangai composite (CH), India: Bombay Sensex (IN), Brazil: Brazil Bovespa $ (BZ), New 
Zealand: DJTM NEW ZEALAND $ (NZ), South Africa: DJTM SOUTH AFRICA $ (SA). Sources: PSE, Data 
Stream 
6   Monthly closing prices of CZK/USD, CZK/EUR and CZK/JPY exchange rates were taken from ČNB 
ARAD. I calculated the cross exchange rate for CZK/YUYN, CZK/BRL and CZK/INR. We used the monthly 
opening prices of YUAN/USD, INR/USD and BRL/USD taken from Data Stream. Again we assume that the one 
day difference should have only a neglectable impact on the investment decision. 
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, , where  X  a historical 
standard deviation of return series and  ) , ( Y X Cov is the covariance between two data sets of 
stock returns. 
 
Table 1: Monthly correlation coefficients       
                 
   CR  US  EU  JA  RS  CH  IN  BZ  SA  NZ 
CR  1,00                
US  0,26  1,00              
EU  0,37  0,73  1,00            
JA  0,25  0,62  0,51  1,00         
RS  0,44 0,45 0,49 0,45 1,00            
CH  0,32 0,26 0,32 0,30 0,63 1,00          
IN  0,26 0,06 0,18 0,10 0,25 0,81 1,00        
BZ  0,42 0,51 0,62 0,37 0,58 0,44 0,21 1,00       
SA  0,31 0,41 0,46 0,42 0,45 0,38 0,24 0,46  1,00     
NZ  0,20 0,52 0,52 0,48 0,39 0,32 0,17 0,35  0,52 1,00
 
 
As we can see from the Table 1 above, the lowest monthly correlation was between Czech 
stock market and the markets in New Zealand and Japan. The price increase on Czech market 
was accompanied only by up to 25% surge in a price movement in these two countries. On the 
other hand, the highest monthly correlation was between Czech and Russian stock market. 
But even between these two countries did not reached a 50 % level. Interesting observation is 
that all coefficients are positive. Positive correlation signifies the partial comovement of the 
stock prices between Czech and other world markets. Highest monthly correlation reveal the 
markets of China and India (0,81) and of the US and EU (0,73). On the contrary, the lowest 
correlated pairs are the markets of India and New Zealand (0,17) and of the Czech Republic 
and New Zealand (0,2). These low correlation coefficients signal good opportunities for 
diversification. 
 
Based on these data we can conclude that Czech equity market is better integrated with the 
developed than with the emerging markets, because of the higher correlation coefficients. 16 
 
With the markets of the US, Japan, EU and South Africa, there are higher profit possibilities 
from diversification if we invest on a monthly basis. The important conclusion is that Czech 
stock market is not perfectly world integrated. Therefore, there should be very good 
incentives for Czech investors to invest abroad.  
 
V. 3. Results of the model with Markowitz utility 
 
In this section we will discuss the model of the optimal portfolio model for different levels of 
risk aversion and different time horizons.  Let us first look on the result of the optimal 
portfolio model for an investor who invests with an investment horizon of one month and is 
allowed to short sell.  
 
Table 3 : Optimal monthly portfolio weights (Markowitz utility, 
with short selling) 
 
         
Investor’s risk 
aversion:  3   2   1    1/2  1/3 
Czech Republic  0,72 0,92 1,52 2,72 3,92 
United States  0,12 0,04 -0,23 -0,75 -1,27 
European 
Union  -0,11 -0,26 -0,69 -1,56 -2,44 
Japan  -0,11 -0,22 -0,54 -1,18 -1,83 
Russia  0,13 0,26 0,63 1,39 2,14 
China  -0,18 -0,29 -0,61 -1,26 -1,92 
India  0,04 0,07 0,17 0,36 0,55 
Brazil  -0,01 0,03 0,15 0,39 0,63 
South Africa  0,11 0,15 0,26 0,47 0,69 
New Zealand  0,28 0,29 0,34 0,43 0,52 
Utility gain  -0,001 0,004 0,014 0,031 0,047 
 
As we can see from the Table 3 the leader is the Czech stock index. Optimal decision is to 
“borrow” money and invest into it more than initial wealth for all cases of tested risk aversion 
except the case  3   . For investors with such risk aversion the optimal outcome would be no 
investment. Under our assumptions, no investment yields zero return. Utility of zero risk-free 
return is zero which is higher than the returns from the portfolio. As we can see from the 
Table 3 the investors should invest mainly into Czech stock index. The investment strategy 
should focus also on the acquiring the shares of New Zealand, South Africa, India, Brazil, 17 
 
Russia and US. On the other hand, the investor should short sell EU, Japanese and Chinese 
indices. We can see that with decreasing risk aversion the amount of investments increases in 
both directions. The less risk averse the more the investor buys “good” stocks and the more he 
sells “bad” stocks. Also we can see that higher risk aversion implies lower gains in utility. In 
this sense, the risk aversion is a negative trait of investors that damages their utility. 
 
In the real world the short selling is very costly and in most of the cases it is virtually 
impossible to short sell an ordinary stock index. On the contrary, it is usually possible to take 
a short position in the derivative instruments like futures and options that consist of these 
stock indices. However, the trading on derivative markets has a barrier for ordinary investors. 
It is costly and the trades occur in high figures. Furthermore, the derivative instruments 
increase the risks and multiply the expected returns which is suitable for big financial 
institutions, but not for individual investors. Therefore, in the following table we will show 
what the optimal portfolio of an investor without the short selling possibility would be. 
 
Table 4: Optimal monthly portfolio weights (Markowitz 
utility, no short selling)   
         
Investor’s risk 
aversion:  3 2 1  1/2  1/3
 
Czech Republic  0,71 0,84 0,86 0,75 0,63 
United States  0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Japan  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Russia  0,00 0,05 0,14 0,25 0,37 
South Africa  0,07 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,00 
New Zealand  0,21 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Utility -0,002 0,002 0,007 0,009 0,010 
 
For the model without short selling we had to use a numerical method to find solutions. It is a 
standard convex problem on polyhedral feasibility set, which assures that the numerical 
method has a unique solution
7. Also in this case of world without the possibility to sell 
equities short, only investors  with  2   would gain from investments. For the coefficient of 
risk aversion 2 / 1   , the Czech investor would choose about 75 % of Czech equities and 25 
% Russian equities. For  1   , the Czech investor would choose about 86 % of Czech 
equities and 14 % Russian equities. As we can conclude from the Tables 3 and 4 the happiest 
                                                 
7As it is explained in textbook of Chong and Zak (2001).  18 
 
investor would be the investor with the lowest risk aversion that is able to sell the stock 
indices short. Investor with  3 / 1    would gain 4,7 % increase in his utility if he is allowed 
to short sell free of costs, but gains only 1 % if he is not. 
 
Let us draw an overall conclusion from the results of the model. A risk averse Czech investor 
with the Markowitz utility function with reasonable levels of risk aversion would invest more 
than 60 % of his money into Czech equities. Do not forget that for the sake of simplicity of 
the model I did not take into account other investment opportunities. In our model the only 
alternative to investment into stock indices is no investment at all. This is a weak point of our 
model, but can be also interpreted behaviorally. This model would imply that the investors 
choose a part of their wealth that is meant only for investments into equities. This fact is not 
so unrealistic if we realize that the most of the financial institutions have some limits on 
equity investments. Also financial advisers usually recommend that only certain percentage of 
the investor’s wealth should be invested into stocks. The managers of pension funds have also 
limits of the funds they are allowed to invest into equities (Zalewska, 2005).  
 
We should not forget about the exchange rate risk and risk of inflation. Exchange rate risk in 
our model became a part of the index risk, because the foreign indices were recalculated in 
USD terms. The returns of Czech stock index were without the exchange rate risk component. 
Therefore I implicitly assumed that the Czech investors hold their wealth in Czech crowns, 
i.e. without any exchange rate risk for Czech index. Foreign investors holding foreign 
currency would have to exchange money and therefore the Czech equities would be riskier for 
them than for domestic investors.  
 
V.4. Results of the model with exponential utility 
 
As was mentioned above we will hereafter focus only on the solutions with restricted short 
selling. We use the estimations of the coefficient of risk aversion from the paper of (Bliss and 
Panigirtzoglou, 2004):  91 , 0   .
8 As you can find in Table 5 Czech investors should hold 72 
% of Czech and 28 % Russian equities in their portfolios. 
 
 
                                                 
8 This is an option-implied coefficient for 4 weeks (1 month)  period on 95 % level of significance. 19 
 
        Table 5: Optimal monthly portfolio weights (exponential utility, no short selling) 
Risk aversion:  0,91




V.5. Results of the model with CRRA utility 
We use the estimations of the coefficient of risk aversion from the paper of (Bliss and 
Panigirtzoglou, 2004):  05 , 4   .
9  Table 6 reveals that the optimal weights for Czech 
investors should be: 83 % for Czech, 5 % for Russian, 8 % for South African and 4 % for 
New Zealand´s equities. These results of the model with CRRA are perhaps the most reliable, 
because the CRRA model is independent on absolute value of wealth, e.g. it does not make a 
difference if the investor invest 1 CZK our 1 million CZK. The optimal weights remain the 
same for small and also big investors. 
 
       Table 6: Optimal monthly portfolio weights (CRRA utility,  no short selling) 
Risk aversion:  4,05
Czech Republic  0,83
Russia  0,05
South Africa  0,08
New Zealand  0,04
 
 
V. 6. Czech equity portfolio: OECD statistics 
 
The most valuable evidence of the portfolio allocation of Czech investors can be obtained 
from the OECD data. Table 7 provides the evidence of the stock of assets and liabilities for 
different sectors at the end of 2006. The domestic equities held by Czech investors are on the 
asset side of the balance sheet, foreign equities can be found on the side of liabilities of rest of 




     
                                                 
9 This is an option-implied coefficient for 4 weeks (1 month)  period on 95 % level of significance. 
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Table 7: Financial balance sheets of Czech Republic          
          
A: Assets          
mil CZK  Financial  Non financial  Government Households
10 
Total 
economy Rest  of  World 
Shares and other equity  144 488  488 704 771 833 306 810  1 711 835  1 595 246
Mutual funds  27 854  18 088    225 350  271 292    
Shares and mutual funds  172 342  506 792 771 833 532 160  1 983 127  1 595 246
        
B: Liabilities          
mil CZK  Financial  Non financial  Government Households 
Total 
economy Rest  of  World 
Shares and other equity  223 471  2 907 440       3 130 911  176 170
Mutual funds  156 392           156 392  114 900
Shares and mutual funds  379 863  2 907 440 0 0  3 287 303  291 070
Source: OECD 2006             
 
At the end of 2006 Czech investors owned 1 711 billion CZK in shares and other equities, of 
which 45 % owned the government, 29 % non financial, 18 % households and 8 % financial 
institutions. Almost the same amount of Czech equities was owned by the rest of world.   
Foreign investors owned more equities (1 595 billion CZK) in Czech Republic than Czech 
investors owned foreign equities (291 billion CZK).  
 
To answer the question whether there is home bias we have to compute the ratio of domestic 
equities in the equity portfolio of Czech investors. If we include the mutual funds
11 into 
equity, the ratio of domestic/total equities in Czech portfolio was 87,2 %
12. This high figure 
can be little bit biased, because it includes the government, which is not a typical investor. 
However, if the government is excluded, the ratio is still quite high: 83, 3 %.   
 
If we compare these figures with the results of our model without short selling possibility that 
are shown in Tables 4 – 6, we can conclude that the model is not in favor of the equity home 
bias hypothesis in the Czech Republic. Results of utility maximization problem with three 
different utility functions indicate that the optimal weight for Czech equities should be above 
60 % and for reasonable levels of risk aversions between 72-83%. 
 
                                                 
10   Including nonprofit institutions serving households 
11   Assuming that mutual funds are perfect substitutes to foreign shares. 




People prefer to buy stocks of their own country despite the loss they suffer. This is evident 
based on the findings of the research in international portfolio studies. In this paper we have 
tried not only to provide evidence of the “home bias” phenomenon, but also to provide 
theoretical explanations of its sources. The market imperfections as the barriers to entry, 
transaction and information costs are one of the institutional reasons for the creation of home 
biased portfolio. However, the institutional features can explain only partly the home 
biasness, there is not a model that evaluates the impact of these factors together. It is difficult 
to quantify the impact of factors such as asymmetric information and corporate governance 
have on the investment decisions. The international evidence shows the imperfection of 
traditional finance models that assume no barriers to entry to equity markets, zero transaction 
and information costs and dispersed ownership of companies that works without any agency 
problems. 
 
Behavioral finance can help us to understand how the investors are making their investment 
decision. Evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that the assumption of rationality in 
traditional financial sense is too strong and unrealistic. It is actually quite irrational to assume 
rationality. People reveal many psychological biases. Some of these biases can provide us 
with explanations of the propensity of investors to prefer domestic equities. Investors tend to 
be too optimistic about the future perspectives of a domestic firm. Narrow framing and loss 
aversion can also lead to home biasness. However insightful the behavioral theories are, the 
exact impact of the irrationality is difficult to assess. Second conclusion is therefore quite 
similar to the first one. Behavioral finance that assumes specific form of irrationality can 
partly explain the home bias puzzle. 
 
However, based on our model and actual evidence from Czech Republic we could not prove 
the home biasness of Czech investors. This conclusion is a result of the comparison of the 
evidence of international portfolio allocation and the model of optimal portfolio allocation. 
Czech investors hold 87 % domestic equities out of total equity holdings. This figure includes 
the ownership of Czech government. The model without short selling for three different utility 
functions suggests that there should be more than 60 % of domestic equities in the portfolio 
(and 72-83 % for the feasible levels of risk aversion ). 
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The weakness of this conclusion can be found in the assumptions of the model and a data 
selection. The model of optimal portfolio allocation assumes perfect markets and rational 
investors. The student´s questionnaire indicates that even trained students of economics do 
not make their decisions in the same way as the model would predict. The model also 
assumes that there are no transaction costs, including the costs with currency costs. The model 
does not take into account other investment opportunities. Furthermore, the period 1998 – 
2008 was very successful for the Czech stock market. Therefore, this paper may be revisited 
after several years to show if the Czech equities are so desirable for the investors in longer 
run.  
 
There is a big potential in future research in the field of behavioral finance. Models able to 
simulate truthfully the decisions of irrational investors could explain the home bias. In my 
opinion, the home bias is result of both factors: the imperfection of markets and investors. It 
would be interesting, but very demanding, to combine the institutional with behavioral 
factors. The factors behind the home biasness can help us in understanding of the financial 
world in reality. Financial models have made predictions based on unrealistic assumptions 



















List of abbreviations and symbols: 
 
BRL   Brazilian  real 
BZ    Brazil Bovespa index 
CH    Shanghai composite index 
CR    PX stock index 
CZK    Czech  crown 
EU    DJ Eurostox 50 
IN   Bombay  Sensex 
INR    Indian  rupee 
JA   Nikkei 
JPY   Japanese  yen 
NZ    DJTM New Zealand  - Price index in $ 
RS    RTS – Russian price index in $ 
SA   DJTM South Africa  - Price index in $ 
US    Standard and Poor’s 500 
YUAN  Chinese  Yuan 
 
r     Average returns of stock indices 
   Portfolio weights 
   Variance-covariance matrix 
     Coefficient of risk aversion 
t W     Investor’s wealth at time t 
U     Utility function of investors 
L   Langrange  function 
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